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ABSTRACT 
Terrorism has flooded the international stage with radical ideologies and spectacular 
explosions, kidnappings and assassinations. It has left fear, loathing and heaps of 
innocent bodies in its wake. But this was not always the case. There was, once upon a 
time, when terrorism was “cool!” Drawing from sociocultural and geopolitical events in 
post-war Germany, I examine how West German citizens in the 1970s were able to 
sympathize with a leftist terrorist organization known as the Red Army Faction. I aim to 
examine the sympathetic tendencies toward terrorist organizations in the 1970s by 
studying specific subgroups of the sympathetic German public in this ear into: 
hyperactive, active, passive, hyper-passive, and the disassociators. The findings shed 
light on how sociocultural and geopolitical events, especially as reported by the media, 
influenced sympathetic audiences of this terrorist organization.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“We’re not feeling edgy; the system is feeling nervous” 
—from the Red Army Faction’s “Serve the People: The Urban Guerilla and Class 
Struggle” 
 
Unsuccessful Marxist campaigns of terrorism flooded the international stage in 
the 1970s, laying claim to ending state oppression; they led to social and cultural changes 
still present in society today. Fresh out of the Second World War, the spread of leftist 
ideals were a part of everyday life in the Federal Republic (West Germany) in an effort to 
push as far away from their fascist past as possible. The appeal of communism derives 
from Karl Marx’s theory of revolution being the necessity of change in a state, but urban 
guerillas exaggerated the theory, forcing change upon individuals who were not ready for 
it. Marxism and anarchism were the trendy movements to support in the 1970s. The Red 
Army Faction (RAF) led this movement as the ‘chic’ revolutionaries fighting for an anti-
fascist West Germany. In a GEO Epoche magazine issue covering the “Rote Armee 
Fraktion,” (Red Army Faction or RAF) the inside cover pictured RAF leader Ulrike 
Meinhof squatting fiercely with an automatic rifle with the quote, “Of course we say that 
the cops are pigs, we say the guy in the uniform is a pig, and not a human, so we have to 
deal with them. That means that we do not have to speak with him, and it is wrong to 
speak to these people at all, and of course you can shoot” (2015: 2)- providing an 
accurate description of the organization.  
It was a split second decision for Ulrike Meinhof to follow Andreas Baader and 
Gudrun Ensslin out the window at the German Central Institute for Social Issues in Berlin 
after their prison escape plan turned into chaos. Ulrike Meinhof’s choice to follow the 
other members of the crew on May 14, 1970 sparked the official formation of the “Rote 
Armee Fraktion”. Less than a month later, on June 5, 1970, an underground West 
German paper, Agit883 (Magazine for Agitation and Social Practice), published an 
 2 
article written by Ensslin calling upon those who have been exploited and marginalized 
to “Build Up the Red Army!,” thus declaring the official formation of the RAF. Soon 
after, members and new recruits fled to Jordan where they were trained with their fellow 
guerillas’, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). The RAF’s reign of terror over West Germany lasted 
twenty-eight years, starting with bank robberies that escalated to kidnappings, bombings, 
and plane hijackings near the end of its existence. While several sociocultural and 
geopolitical factors in post-war Germany influenced the birth of the RAF, the 
organization would not have survived for so long if it did not have the support of 
sympathizers across West Germany.  
 The RAF’s legacy lives on through nicknames that vary from the Baader-Meinhof 
Gruppe and the Baader-Meinhof Gang plastered on t-shirts to stickers on street lamps in 
Germany today. First published in 1985, Stephan Aust’s Der Baader-Meinhof Komplex 
(The Baader-Meinhof Complex), shed light upon the organization by putting a human 
face on its main members and presenting them as victims of the Federal Republic of 
Germany – or even as martyrs for a cause soon to become irrelevant after the downfall of 
Communism and the reunification of the two Germanys. The 1960s and 1970s were a 
period of cultural, political, and social change. New values calling for social equality and 
acceptance of youth’s radical demands clashed with traditional values and sparked social 
movements that inspired change in society. Post-war Germany continued to weaken when 
the western allies chose to divide Germany, causing more trouble in the future. With a 
broken nation, West Germany became a breeding ground for social and political change, 
determined to avoid the horrors of the past. Thus, the RAF emerged from years of social 
and political dissent within leftist movements that sought to take their beliefs to an  
extreme and engage in violence for their attainment. The “Urban Guerilla” was adopted 
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from Ché Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare (1961) as a tactic to fight the repressive West 
German regime, once a handful of protesters realized that organized protests were not 
drawing enough attention to the government. Dubbed the “Golden Age of Terrorism,” 
(Bergen and Schuster 2015) several violent leftist movements acted upon the 
international stage, joining together to fight against state oppression. This thesis focuses 
on the particular case of RAF sympathizers, and how sociocultural and geopolitical 
factors contributed to the organization’s positive reception by the citizens of West 
Germany. While the RAF’s reign of terror lasted twenty-eight years, I focus on the First 
Generation, consisting of its main actors: Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and Gudrun 
Ensslin, who were the ‘superstars’ of the organization. From their own writings to secret 
interviews with Der Spiegel, their message became well known across the West German 
nation. The RAF’s rationale through communiqués and letters to newspaper publications 
connected the average citizen with their cause.  
This thesis has a multifarious approach. Each chapter provides historical, 
sociocultural and political facets that record the sympathy with extreme violent actions 
carried out by terrorist organizations, in the context of the RAF. The origin of sympathy 
is derived from German psychiatrist Edward Titchener’s term ‘Einfühlung’, or ‘feeling 
into’; the term has transformed into a philosophical and theoretical question that applies 
to the core understanding of human nature (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008). 
My definition of sympathy, in relation to those who sympathize with acts of terrorism, 
derives from the French term sympathisant. Many years later, the German language 
adopted this term to identify leftist supporters of the violent acts of the RAF, whether it 
was individuals who wrote famous pieces of literature, participated in protests, or 
believed in the ideology. In the first chapter I start by outlining historical events that led 
up to the formation of the RAF, and how these events set the framework for sympathy to 
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RAF’s cause. Using Pitor Sztompka’s model for cultural trauma, the collective post-war 
cultural trauma experienced by West German citizens predisposes individuals to 
sympathize with actions, violent or non-violent, that would prevent West Germany’s 
perceived propensity to slide back to its fascist past. The second chapter examines First 
Generation members of the RAF in relation to their connection with West German 
citizens. The appeal of the members, and their presence in the left scene before the 
formation of the RAF, set the stage of recognition in the media for West German citizens. 
This chapter also addresses the importance of communication with the citizens of West 
Germany, and the RAF’s steady appearance in the media to advocate and provide a 
rationale for their cause. The third chapter outlines the five levels of a sympathetic 
audience that culminated from sociocultural and political factors that I mention in the 
previous chapters. Finally, I conclude with the fourth chapter that supports my theoretical 
claims for the five levels of sympathy with the case of the Red Army Faction.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Historical Factors that Led to Sympathetic Tendencies for Extreme Acts 
 
 
“If you throw a stone, it’s a crime. If a thousand stones are thrown, that’s political. If you 
set fire to a car it’s a crime; if a hundred cars are set on fire that’s political” 
—Ulrike Meinhof1 
 
The stage was being set for the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in West Germany 
long before the core members of the organization, Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and 
Gudrun Ensslin, were approached by Horst Mahler to form the group. The Second World 
War divided Germany among the four powers, and its citizens were left to cope with their 
Nazi past. An ideological war between the democratic and communist powers not only 
produced a stark difference in the governance of the Eastern and Western blocs, but a 
physical wall that emerged in 1961 kept the Western citizens from entering the Eastern 
side of Berlin. Understanding the West German past prior to the terror attacks in the 
1970s will provide a context through political and sociocultural factors that induced 
individuals to support the ideology of the RAF. This chapter outlines the global and 
domestic politics, economic changes, and sociocultural events that West Germans faced 
on a daily basis. This situation impacted their perception of the RAF’s war against the 
West German government. The historical events below are not just a testament to West 
Germans fighting for a stable democracy, but are quite possibly stepping-stones to acts of 
extreme violence. Thus the continuance of the extreme violence brought upon by the 
RAF through the period of a divided Germany could only have lasted due to the 
sympathy and support of the population.  
After surrendering their arms in May 1945, Germany admitted defeat in the 
                                                
1 Aust, Stefan. 2008. The Baader Meinhof Complex. London: The Bodley Head. 
 p. 36. 
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Second World War. Less than three months later the Allies drafted the Four Power 
Agreement in the Potsdam Conference to divide Germany into four parts, where the 
United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union aimed to take part in the 
rebuilding of Germany in hopes of preventing it from causing global unrest again. Soon 
after, the three Western Allies, the United States, Great Britain, and France, established 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the western bloc, and the Soviet Union 
established the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the eastern bloc. While the GDR 
was used as a tool to retain Soviet influence in Europe, the Western bloc immersed itself 
in liberal democratic values and a capitalist economic system. Germans in both the 
western and eastern zones had little choice but to conform to the swiftly changing climate 
(Hanshew 2012: 35). As Hanshew rightly puts it, the German citizens really did not have 
a choice of where they could go. The West German psyche was in utter disarray, with a 
blow to their national character from confronting their fascist past, repercussions of the 
Holocaust, a new divided Germany, and now their new seemingly democratic republic 
that was crucial for their survival.  
The first democratic election in West Germany elected Konrad Adenauer in 1949, 
with a promising future for West Germany. ‘Chancellor democracy,’ then, fulfilled a 
need for firm and inspirational leadership since, although Germans had moved on from 
the Nazi period and had embraced democracy, the desire for strong government remained 
– not to mention residual sympathy with the achievements of Nazism (Thomas 2003: 25). 
Surveys carried out by OMGUS (Occupation Military Government, United States) from 
1947 to 1950 found the majority of respondents described the best form of government 
for Germany to be a democracy, while only one percent stated that a communist 
government would be the best government for Germany. This reflects the initial or 
already existing fears of communism from the Cold War context (Merritt 1995: 93). 
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Further, Merritt writes about a concept of legitimized authority that bedeviled Germans 
during the Nazi era (and the Allied authorities afterward) and linked authority to 
obedience. He quotes a survey from March 1946 where two-fifths of the respondents 
agreed with the statement that “the individual should always obey the orders of the state 
without question” (Merritt 1995: 93). At the start of Adenauer’s first chancellery, the 
Allied forces initiated a denazification process to eliminate Nazism from politics, media, 
law, culture, and anything else that pointed back to Germany’s recent fascist past. 
Through his interviews with women’s first hand experiences during the denazification, 
Alf Lüdtke describes that, in, the Western zones, efforts toward denazification rapidly 
turned into an enormous bureaucratic machine that produced a lot of paperwork. 
Therefore it should be no surprise that its performance and its results confirmed self-pity 
and notions of “we the victims” among the majority of the German population (Lüdtke 
1993: 549). The outcome of this failed process foreshadows the resentment by West 
German citizens toward the government for allowing former Nazi officers to hold office 
in the new democratic regime. As the economic miracle, Wirtschaftswunder, occurred in 
the 1950s disagreements amongst political officials fell into the shadow. Citizens were 
distracted by dazzling consumer products they were able to purchase, and began to pay 
less attention to daily politics. A prosperous economy paved the way for the West 
Germans to focus on individual gratification rather than collective well being. It became 
difficult to critique a government (occupied by former National Socialist officials thought 
it may have been) who brought jobs, food, and American goods to their homes. Prior to 
1948, German citizens lived under price control and rations imposed by Hitler, who 
prioritized buying weapons for the war (Henderson 2008). Henry Wallich wrote about the 
struggle of West German citizens during this time: 
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Each day, and particularly on weekends, vast hordes of people trekked out to the 
country to barter food from the farmers. In dilapidated railway carriages from 
which everything pilferable had long disappeared, on the roofs and on the running 
boards, hungry people traveled sometimes hundreds of miles at snail’s pace to 
where they hoped to find something to eat. They took their wares—personal 
effects, old clothes, sticks of furniture, whatever bombed-out remnants they had—
and came back with grain or potatoes for a week or two (1955: 65). 
 
Daily life in the beginning of West Germany was difficult, and adding in the factor of 
cultural trauma from the Second World War posed a threat to the already dampened 
German psyche. Citizens were forced to make ends meet, placing their hopes of a better 
future on the newly elected chancellor. Soon after, the combination of the Allied forces 
ending the price control in 1948 and the currency reform were the main catalysts of the 
West German economic miracle, and put the economy back to the forefront of the 
European market. Heller wrote that the economic reforms “quickly reestablished money 
as the preferred medium of exchange and monetary incentives as the prime mover of 
economic activity” (1949: 215). While the West Germans were experiencing the start of a 
productive capitalist economic system aided by the surplus of western goods, the East 
German economy remained stagnant with its citizens becoming envious of the selection 
of western goods that they did not have access to. The power of western consumerism 
grew in West Germany, and the desire for more western goods, predominately American 
goods, increased. Milena Veenis and Wiesen both state that the power of attraction of the 
American-inspired consumer world in postwar West Germany is generally analyzed in 
relation to “West Germans’ sense of ‘injured citizenship’,” with the “imagined 
community of the social market economy [defining] consumption as central to new, post-
Hitler conception of citizenship” (2011: 489-524 and 2003: 151-79). The American 
consumer world, as represented at trade fairs and in advertisements “served as 
orchestrated moments of forgetting” (Campbell 1987: 80) the troubles of the Cold War 
and their government.  
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 Around the same time, the early 1950s, social movements began advocating for 
women’s rights in West Germany. While women’s movements were not new in 
Germany, some dating back to voting rights pre-World War I and abortion rights during 
the Weimar and Nazi periods, the post- World War II movements emerged from the 
abundance of women outnumbering the men by seven million in 1946 (Kolinsky 1989: 
25 and 79), due to many deaths in the war. Without a patriarch, women were forced to 
enter into the workforce. The unequal pay and lack of maternity leave compensation 
caused women to protest for equality. Ulrike Meinhof advocated for these rights in a 
konkret article, titled Frauenkram, covering the large income difference between men 
and women. She asked, “why despite enjoying the guarantee of equal rights in the Basic 
Law women still do not have emancipation” (Meinhof 1968). The question is addressed 
in Nick Thomas’ research on protests and social movements in West Germany where the 
answer lay in traditional views on “femininity” and the role of women: a survey 
conducted in 1964 found that 75 percent of men and 72 percent of women believed 
women’s place was in the home (Frevert 1989: 287 and Thomas 2003: 225). The 
movement transformed in the 1960s with the new sexual liberation movements that 
created conflict with the traditional values of women during the time.  
 As social transformation and economic prosperity shined light upon West 
Germany, East Germans were not privy to those experiences. On August 13, 1961 a wall 
was built by the East Germans to protect their communist values from their westernized 
neighbors. The antifascist bulwark, the antifascist protection wall, later called the Berlin 
Wall, stood as a centerpiece of Berlin until its fall in November 1989. Families and 
friends were torn apart, and left with no information as to when they would be able to see 
their loved ones again. Already experiencing the cultural trauma of confronting their Nazi 
past and cultural differences from living in a divided Germany, the physical appearance 
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of the wall provided a worse realization of a forever-divided Germany. The building of 
the Berlin Wall solidified the straining tensions between the western allies and the Soviet 
Union, and left the West German government to condemn any radical ideologies that 
threatened its new democratic system.  
Returning to domestic politics, the second chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, sold his 
soul to the United States in 1963, and supported the U.S. goal of dominance in Vietnam. 
The continued support by the third chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in 1966 caused many 
young West Germans to lose faith in the government, and to join together to protest 
against government policies. The early stages of the German Student Movement began as 
early as 1965 when students began to take action against the government with socialist 
ideologies as their guide. Five large protests occurred in 1965 regarding overcrowding of 
universities. In the course of twelve years, the number of students attending university 
doubled, from 123,154 in 1952 to 274,392 in 1964, and caused the universities via the 
government to refuse entry to qualified students (Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden 
1953, 1960, and 1969). While the government tried to keep up with the rising number of 
students by opening new universities, it was seemingly impossible. The students also 
addressed concerns about issues such as the Wirtschaftswunder success plateauing, poor 
parliamentary decisions such as the Emergency Legislation (Notstandsgesetze), 
reformation of the university curriculum and the access of students to it, West Germany’s 
role of support in the Vietnam war, and even bias of the press, specifically speaking out 
against the popular, wide circulation Bild Zeitung. Protesters against the Vietnam War 
especially emphasized their dissent of American imperialism forced upon Vietnam, and 
parallels to American imperialism were made with the American government having a 
heavy hand in the West German government. Students joined protests all around the 
world fighting the struggle against imperialism. The Parliament’s multiple attempts at 
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passing the Emergency Legislation contributed to many students joining the protests. If 
passed, the West German government would then have the ability to strip away the civil 
liberties given in their less than two decade old constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 
and turn West Germany into a police state. The students then would have a sound 
argument for the West German state returning to its fascist past. While students were not 
the only citizens aware of these issues, there was a stark difference in how the two 
generations, those who lived during the Second World War and the post-war generation, 
reacted to these situations. Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski emphasize that these 
differences of opinion in confronting the Nazi past led to the conflict in which 
“generational cleavages in the Federal Republic are more pronounced than in other 
comparable liberal democracies” (1993: 21-2). Their post-war surveys of the West 
German Left show that there is a contrast between the opinions of the older generation 
who lived through Nazism and those who came after. These studies reveal that the older 
generation diverted their guilt of the Nazi past while the younger generation’s protests 
were “a critique of the complacency and accommodation of the Bonn republic’s 
institutions and political cultures vis-á-vis the Nazi regime” and “the first time that 
massive protests erupted on German soil against Germany’s Nazi period” (Markovits and 
Gorski 1993: 21-2 and Thomas 2003: 26). The post-war, younger generation approached 
these issues differently by taking a moral stance. The University of Mannheim conducted 
a survey in 1968 asking if National Socialism was a good idea, but poorly executed. 
About 50 percent of the general public agreed with this statement while 91 percent of 
students disagreed (HIfS, Box #: Sammlung APO Press, File: Abendzeitung (April 24, 
1968)). Afraid of the impending doom of the West German government, by turning back 
to their fascist past, students continued with protests, weekly flyers, and rallies, with 
prominent leaders of the protests speaking out against the actions of the government. 
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Organizations among university students were formed over the next five years, 
and rallies led by Rudi Dutschke speaking out against the government led to more 
supporters. The turning point of the protests occurred on June 2, 1967 when an unarmed 
student, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot and killed during a protest against the Shah of Iran, 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was visiting West Germany. While there are brief 
accounts of the event, none of the accounts can cover the shooting in full detail. Students 
were against the Shah visiting West Germany because it painted a poor picture of the 
government supporting a corrupt dictator. This was emphasized in the infamous open 
letter to the Shah’s wife, “Offener Breif an Farah Diba,” written by Ulrike Meinhof, in 
konkret prior to the visit (1967: 21-2). The impending protest was rumored to be large, 
and the Federal Interior Ministry gave the Shah’s visit the highest security rating and 
level (Security Level 1), meaning the police had to plan for a possible assassination 
attempt (Thomas 2003: 108). Preparing for the protest, the police were unaware of the 
number of individuals from the Iranian secret service organization, Savak, that were 
going to attend. The lack of communication between the two organizations added to the 
confusion of how to react if the protest turned violent. Protesters showed up that evening 
outside the Deutsche Oper awaiting the arrival of the Shah and his wife. Already 
throwing eggs, stink bombs, and shouting Nazi references (Thomas 2003: 110), the 
police chose to intervene out of fear of an attempt that could be made on the Shah’s life. 
During the clearing, the students and police both turned to violence. An engineering 
student, Heinz-Deiter Kretzmer, gave an eyewitness account of the event:  
Everything looked to me like chaos. I saw police officers climb over the barriers 
and noticed a violent hand-to-hand fight. I heard shouts of ‘murderer’ and also 
chants that I couldn’t understand. I didn’t hear any loudspeaker 
announcements…The officers who had invaded the crowd held their batons in 
raised hands…I also saw how the officers made use of their batons and noticed 
how numerous demonstrators were dragged over the southern side of Bismarck 
Strasse toward the Deutsche Oper, to the lines in the middle of the road, and 
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during the dragging they were beaten with truncheons by the police officers. In 
one case a police officer kicked a demonstrator who had broken free and fallen 
over (Thomas 2003: 111-12). 
 
The evidence of police brutality amidst the students was undeniable. Officers would 
shout comments to the protesters, like “you filthy communists will be thrown back over 
the wall” (Thomas 2003: 112). Simultaneously, police officers like Karl-Heinz Kurras 
clutched their weapons in fear of the situation getting too out of hand. Soon after, Officer 
Kurras shot Benno Ohnesorg, as he claims by mistake, turning Ohnesorg into a martyr for 
the protest movement. This event inspired some of the more radical students to form the 2 
June Movement, which carried out terrorist acts against the West German government 
and less than three years later led to the formation of the RAF.  
 In a period of less than twenty years, the new democratic government of West 
Germany was unable to keep up with the social demands of the post-war generation. The 
disproportionate reaction to protests and eventually to terrorism was the response of an 
immature democracy (Thomas 2003: 239), and an insecure government overlooking its 
Nazi past instead of confronting it. The various political and sociocultural events leading 
up to the formation of the RAF affected West Germany as a whole, and individuals were 
able to relate to many of the issues and fears critical of the puppet regime. Armed with a 
desire to cleanse the West German government of its supposed love affair with the 
western Allies and the Nazi past, a cult of followers started to buy into the idea of a better 
Germany.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Role of the Media in Public Perception 
 
 
“Publish this!”2 
—Note enclosed in RAF texts sent to media outlets 
 
In the first chapter, we discussed the impact of post-war historical developments 
on political and social change in the West German Republic. This chapter will attempt to 
connect these historical events to the members of the RAF. Taking a look at each of the 
core members of the RAF is crucial in understanding how and why citizens felt sympathy 
for the organization. Instead of looking at the mere facts of each case, the humanization 
of Ulrike Meinhoff, and to a lesser degree Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader and Holger 
Meins, gave citizens a chance to see them not only as extreme radicals but as more or less 
ordinary people worthy of human sympathy. The First Generation RAF members became 
frequent front-page headlines that transformed them into ‘terrorist superstars’ who were 
‘fighting the good fight.’ Through Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin’s rationales, and 
Andreas Baader’s infamous struggle to keep his Ray Bans on while being dragged away 
by the police, the RAF became celebrities among West German media.  
The Dominant Role of Ulrike Meinhof in the RAF 
Running parallel to the humanization of the core members, the rhetoric of the 
organization, authored by Ulrike Meinhof, altered the course of sympathetic viewers 
toward the RAF. Instead of having a long history of violence, Meinhof (founder of the 
RAF) was a well-established journalist, dabbling in television and radio, and a figurehead 
of the German Left. Meinhof’s work spoke out for political and social reform toward 
marginalized demographic groups in West Germany. Through her columns and articles, 
                                                
2 Original German: “Veröffentlicht das!.” (GFA, Box #: 362, File: 3130 (pp. 26-32)).  
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she exposed the acts of the government and West German elite to bring justice to the 
citizens of West Germany.  
 Ulrike Meinhof was born on 1934 in a northern German town. Her mother raised 
Meinhof with her younger sister since their father died soon after their births. Her 
childhood consisted of a strong Protestant background with the Hessian Dissent, a group 
that opposed state interference with the church (Krebs 1988: 17). While her mother 
studied at the University of Jena, the children were cared for by extended family, and 
later by a new boarder, Renate Riemeck, who was taken in to share the expenses. After 
the Second World War, Meinhof’s mother passed, and she was left in the care of 
Riemeck. The relationship between Meinhof and Riemeck changed from friendship to 
mentorship as Riemeck introduced her to literature, philosophy, politics, and endowed 
her with a sense of moral obligation to society. Further, in a letter to Meinhof, Riemeck 
saw herself as having a paternal role in Meinhof’s life. She would sign letters to Meinhof 
as “your substitute father” (Röhl 2006: 164). Meinhof became a part of the inner Left 
when her career at konkret soared, with columns speaking out against the West German 
government during the time of the Student Movement in the 1960s. Her work critiqued 
the production and use of nuclear arms, the marginalization of minorities, West 
Germany’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the West German Emergency Laws, and the 
government’s affiliation with autocratic regimes. Meinhof’s career as a journalist 
established her role in the media more than a decade before the formation of the RAF. 
Her influence over the Left established a base of connections that Meinhof later used 
during her time in the RAF. While Meinhof wrote many important pieces, one of her 
most defining works was published at the height of the Student Movement protests in a 
leaflet that motivated students to protest the arrival of the Shah of Iran and his wife. 
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Meinhof’s “Open Letter to Farah Diba” contains a rebuke of the West German 
government for welcoming a leader of an authoritarian regime, and expresses solidarity 
with Iranian citizens “and any developing nations- and the anti-totalitarian and anti-
capitalist sentiment underlying the anti-Shah protests” (Meinhof 2008: 39). On the 
evening of June 2, 1967, a “few thousand” (Meinhof 2008: 39) anti-Shah protesters 
gathered outside the Deutsche Oper in Berlin. This eventful protest, described in the first 
chapter, was the turning point of the radical left’s transitioning to violent actions against 
the state. A month after the event, Meinhof produced a television feature describing in 
great detail the events that occurred during the June 2nd protest. She stated, “The protests 
against the chief of a police state [the Shah] unmask our state as a police state. Terror by 
police and the press reached its high point on June 2 in Berlin. We have come to 
understand that freedom in this state means the freedom of the police truncheon, and 
freedom of the press in the shadow of the Springer Corporation means the freedom to 
justify the truncheon” (Röhl 2006: 560 and Bauer 2008: 42).  
While her career as a journalist bloomed, Meinhof’s life at home began to fall 
apart. Her husband Klaus Rainer Röhl, editor-in-chief of konkret, chose not to follow 
Meinhof down the radicalizing path. The media soon after published articles demonizing 
Meinhof as an unfit mother for her two daughters and a bad wife. The SDS, 
Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist German Student Union-the student 
arm of the SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands- Social Democratic Party of 
Germany), continued to promote Meinhof through the Vietnam Congress that consisted 
of over “five thousand delegates of the New Left from around the world” (Meinhof 2008: 
46) that spoke out against the Vietnam War, sharing the beliefs of the current protests 
occurring all over West Germany. Meinhof and konkret, though, had differing opinions 
than the rest of the West German media about the movement radicalizing, whereas 
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Meinhof and konkret celebrated this after the shooting of Rudi Dutschke, a prominent 
member in the German Left movement. Even left-leaning media such as Der Spiegel 
criticized the acts of protest as excessive and unnecessary. Meinhof’s disappointment in 
the liberal media is articulated in her column entitled “Water Cannons: Against Women 
Too” (1968), singling out Der Spiegel’s founder and editor-in-chief at the time, Rudolf 
Augstein, for his critiques of the movement. The themes of her columns remain 
consistent, arguing that there is no sense in criticizing protesters of the Vietnam War 
because they were protesting crimes against humanity. Her alliance with the moderate-
radical left elevated once she went on an assignment to Frankfurt in October of 1968 to 
report “for konkret on the trial of Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Thorwald Proll, and 
Horst Söhnlein who were accused of arson in a department store” (Meinhof 2008: 50). In 
Meinhof’s report, she criticized the group on the grounds that their act of arson was not 
enough to make a statement against the bourgeoisie, but “on the contrary, it maintains the 
system and is counter-revolutionary” (Koenen 2001: 129). Less than two years later, 
Meinhof conspired with the same individuals she had interviewed to break Baader out of 
prison and officially form the RAF. During this time, the public perception of Meinhof 
was becoming negative, as she left konkret in 1969. The liberal newspaper Frankfurter 
Rundschau published a letter of explanation by Meinhof for leaving konkret due to her 
fear of the magazine joining the rest of the liberal media in working towards “polishing 
the leftist image” (Röhl 1974: 272-73), and essentially selling out the ideology of true 
leftist revolutionaries. Although she accused the liberal media of not staying true to their 
beliefs, the leftist media continued to support her by publishing parts of communiqués 
and treatises throughout her time in the RAF. Even her former husband and editor-in-
chief of the magazine, Röhl, continued to keep a positive image of Meinhof after she left 
konkret, and published a volume of her columns in 1972. Aust notes that “Although he 
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[Röhl] may have profited from the publication of the volume and gained publicity 
through Meinhof, he countered the image of her as the evil terrorist by portraying her 
instead as a serious journalist with a private life as a wife, mother, and [well liked in her 
community]” (2008: 54). Meinhof’s role in the RAF was crucial to legitimation of 
terrorism in West Germany, as she had a history of being a respected journalist – while 
the other members were viewed as pesky arsonists, or troubled youths, turning to 
violence as a justification of their ‘humanistic cause’. Her role as the lead communicator 
of the RAF’s violent acts spin the communist ideology into a compelling storyline that 
romanticizes their cause to the West German, and global, audience.  
A Radical Lawyer, and his Glorified Arsonists 
 Aside from Ulrike Meinhof, the rest of the RAF’s First Generation included 
Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe, Holger Meins, Astrid Proll, Ingrid 
Schubert, Thomas Weissbecker, Petra Schelm, Christa Eckes, Angela Luther, and the 
initial brains of the operation, Horst Mahler, a respected lawyer at the time. To be 
specific, the First Generation included the four founding members: Meinhof, Baader, 
Ensslin, and Mahler; members from other smaller West German terrorist organizations 
that later dissolved, such as June 2 or the Socialist Patients’ Collective (Sozialistisches 
Patientenkollektiv, SPK), joined the organization prior to 1975. The post-1975 RAF 
produced different goals and motives that focused more on breaking the remainder of the 
members out of jail, and extracting financial support through its decreasing group of 
sympathizers. Though the Second and Third Generations kept Meinhof’s legacy alive, the 
members were less appealing to the West German public due to their lack of poise and 
true purpose. Most of the RAF’s support came because of members of the First 
Generation.  
 The primary reason to list the members of the First Generation is to highlight the 
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ratio of men to women in the organization at the time, 1:2 (rounded up). In 1970, the 
BKA (Bundeskriminalamt-Federal Criminal Police Office) produced a wanted poster for 
members suspected to be part of the RAF, which was spread all over West Germany. 
While their intention was to mark the young radicals as threats to the state, this being 
prior to their first large-scale attack, the wanted posters did quite the opposite. The poster, 
shown in Photograph 1, displays pictures of suspected members that humanized the 
members rather than vilifying them as a threat to the Federal Republic. A majority of the 
members shown were also women, and symbolized the strength of women being able to 
engage in these acts rather than in their traditional role as a woman in Germany. Older, 
more conservative citizens viewed this poster as an extension of the radicalized Student 
Movement where young West Germans were deviants of sexual exploration and 
enlightenment, and characterized the RAF members as promoting ideas that could alter 
the traditional German lifestyle. The wanted poster led to several different interpretations 
of the organization, but the message it sent resonated most with the younger generation. 
While the BKA’s intentions were to blacken the RAF’s cause, the organization gained 
more support, as the younger generation was able to connect to their message. The first 
hunt for the members succeeded when German citizens were “asked to participate not 
only in the hunt for members of the so-called ‘Baader-Meinhof Gang’, but also in the 
hunt for sympathizers and clandestine supporters” (Bauer 2008:71). Members were 
described as dressing and acting like ordinary citizens (Bauer 2008: 71). Bild am Sonntag 
stimulated reporting on the hunt for members of the organization in 1972 through 
headlines such as “Tender Nights in the Berber Tent” that described the organization’s 
time in Jordan. This article portrayed Ensslin as an “ice cold seductress,” and an article 
published in Quick, a lifestyle and news magazine, on June 28, 1972 portrayed Meinhof 
as a woman who desexualized herself to turn younger people to violence. This article was 
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paired with a photo of Meinhof surrounded by other women terrorists, and was titled 
“Ulrike Meinhof and her Savage Girls.” This article was the first to make a connection 
between the lifestyles of Meinhof and Ensslin, exposing them as spoiled girls from 
bourgeois homes and having the tendency to “act like men,” insinuating that the women 
had homosexual tendencies. Bild Zeitung took a similar stance, but chose to explain 
Meinhof’s descent into violence as resulting from being unsatisfied with motherhood and 
stating “She wasn’t able to experience the family as a community of love and emotional 
bonds” (June 9, 1972). Bild Zeitung continued to publish pictures of Meinhof and her 
children to remind readers that “Once this was Ulrike Meinhof” (June 6, 1972). The 
media’s real scandal was her dismissal of the traditional role, and not her violent actions. 
Although leftist publications like konkret would publish articles asking Meinhof to 
rethink her role in militant violence by claiming that “You are different, Ulrike, very 
different from what people see when confronted with your picture on the wanted poster 
or what they hear about you in the press, on radio, and television” (Röhl 1974: 305). 
Unfortunately, this message did not cloud the vicious portrayals of Meinhof and the 
women in the RAF to the citizens of West Germany. Meinhof was targeted the most 
compared to the other members due to her intelligence. The other members were 
portrayed as criminals who continued their work for an outrageous cause.  
The Name Game 
 The RAF laid claim to many names during their reign of terror over the Federal 
Republic. Frustrated with media reporting using nicknames such as the Baader-Meinhof 
Gruppe (Group) and Baader-Meinhof Bande (Gang), the names misinformed citizens 
about the organization’s message. The RAF claimed to be a faction because it is a 
formation of political dissenters. A faction is strong, and their creed of leaving no one 
behind was a crucial part of their leftist message. More of the liberal media referred to the 
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organization as the Baader-Meinhof Group, which led to a less negative outlook than the 
reference to ‘gang’ by conservative media to relate the organization to a bad group of 
people. Ulf Stuberger, the only journalist to attend every session of the trial, where the 
state aimed to charge Meinhof, Baader, Ensslin, and Meins for their deviant actions, 
wrote about the federal prosecutor passing on information to reporters that was more 
sympathetic to the State rather than being unbiased. He described meetings when the 
attorney general expressed his desire to report the organization as a gang rather than a 
group (Stuberger 2007: 43-44). Two years later, after the Baader-Meinhof-Report was 
published in 1972, the targeted use of language was confirmed that the State lacked a 
“coherent, political language for a rapid response” (Colvin 2009: 131). 
Media Themes that Gained Support  
 The most notable members of the First Generation, those who the media covered 
most, were Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Holger Meins. Aside 
from Meins, the other three members had previous run-ins with the media when it came 
to radical leftist acts. While Baader and Ensslin were always in the spotlight for their 
arson acts, Meins did not receive as much press until he was jailed at Stammheim during 
the hunger strikes. The organization’s avant garde strategy to motivate the masses 
through direct action was not as successful as their propaganda and media campaigns 
throughout the 1970s. Depicting themselves as revolutionaries sacrificing themselves for 
a less oppressed society against the evil ex-Nazi- occupied West German government, the 
RAF created self-representational themes deriving from the stereotypical good-versus-
evil opposition in their treatises, published in several newspapers and pamphlets. This 
was meant to rationalize their violent acts. Themes such as bravery and sacrifice, loyalty 
and duty, betrayal and solidarity emanated from Meinhof’s work accusing the West 
German government of embodying the banality of the democratic future of West 
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Germany. A day before Meinhof was arrested in 1972 in Hamburg for acts of terror the 
RAF conducted, a package was sent containing her texts to the Frankfurter Rundschau. A 
note enclosed on the top demanding “Publish this!” represented the relationship between 
the organization and the media. Meinhof’s texts were written for different sets of 
audiences: the mainstream media, private recipients, and alternative publishers. 
Meinhof’s “words were integral to the underground interplay between language, image, 
and physical violence: They established what would become the RAF brand and its sharp 
sense of audience recognition. They played a central role in the bombings of May 1972 
and the mainstream appropriation of the radical rhetoric of war and they used ideology to 
perform distinctly non-ideological discourses” (Passmore 2011: 33).  
Sympathy and support for the organization throughout the 1970s can be described 
as a rollercoaster. The rise and fall of sympathy for the RAF is characterized by four 
major themes in the media during the 1970s. First, the May Offensive was the first four 
bombings in Frankfurt, Ausburg, Hamburg, and Heidelberg (1972)- that were counted as 
political attacks since the locations were military, police, or the corrupt Springer 
publication enterprise sites. These attacks surprised West German citizens, and the RAF’s 
intention to gain support backfired, as citizens did not want to condone extreme radical 
methods. Second, the arrests by and brutality of the police in connection with the 
founding members of the RAF (1972 and earlier) caused the citizens to look at the 
members separately, rather than as a group. This humanized the members as individuals 
who wanted to further the leftist cause. The famous picture of Baader fixing his 
sunglasses while being dragged away by the police, shown in Photograph 2, became an 
iconic portrait of the organization that depicted them as ‘cool’ radicals. In addition, the 
hunger strikes and the trail at Stammheim gained more support for the RAF as the media 
published pictures of Meins and compared him to a Holocaust victim. Third, the German 
 23 
Autumn (1977) witnessed a sharp decline of support for the organization due to the 
Second Generation’s poor execution of a kidnapping, and hijacking a plane. The media 
then was able to portray the group as weak due to its core members being jailed. And 
fourth, the deaths of Meinhof, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe at Stammheim (1976-77) due 
to not fully explained suicides that generated conspiracy theories and gained support for 
the organization by seeming to confirm the brutalities of the State. 
The May Offensive 
 The May Offensive began with Ensslin’s idea to bomb the U.S. Army Corp 
headquarters in Frankfurt in May 1972. The next day two more bomb attacks were 
launched, the first at a police headquarters in Augsburg, and the second at a State 
Criminal Police Office in Munich. The third bombing was intended to be for Commando 
Manfred Grashof, but his wife started the car instead setting off the bomb. The fourth and 
final bombing was an example of how the RAF built relationships with other extremist 
organizations to further their cause by putting aside their ideological differences. This 
attack, initiated by Meinhof against the Springer (publisher of the virulently anti-RAF 
Bild Zeitung) building in Hamburg, was executed by the 2 June Movement, an anarchist 
West German terrorist organization that shared members with the RAF. Ensslin, Baader, 
and Meins were all part of the execution of the bombings, and Meinhof was part of this 
with her typewriter. These actions created a decrease of support for the RAF across the 
Federal Republic, as this was the organization’s first act outside of their ideological 
ramblings.  
 At the end of May, the Frankfurter Rundschau published an RAF communiqué 
warning citizens to stay in their homes on June 2. This appeared to be a false text, and 
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sparked a new fight between the RAF and the media.3Authored by Meinhof, the RAF 
continued to stress their declarations as being “political content” (politischer Inhalt) 
rather than empty threats against the Federal Republic (GFA, Box #: 362, File: 3130 (pp. 
245)). Their strategy transitioned to ‘propaganda of the deed’, where they first attacked, 
and then declared their rationale through a declaration. The mainstream media, however, 
focused on something else. Instead of publishing these declarations, the mainstream 
media focused on imagery and horrific pictures of the bombings. On May 13, 1972 the 
Frankfurter Rundschau published photographs of the destruction from the bombs with 
the headline, “Such attacks only in Vietnam until now” (“Solche Anschläge bisher nur in 
Vietnam”). Articles like this took away from the RAF’s own comparison of the Vietnam 
War and imperialist struggle, and turned the media’s rhetoric to viewing the Federal 
Republic as a warzone, similar to Vietnam. The RAF’s actions during the May Offensive, 
then, diminished sympathy as the media portrayed them as militants willing to blow up 
anything for their cause.  
Police Brutality and the Hunger Strikes  
 Soon after the May Offense, the core members of the RAF were arrested. Baader, 
Raspe, and Meins were arrested after they were seen near a garage where they stored 
their explosives on June 1, 1972. Ensslin was arrested while shopping for a sweater in 
Hamburg only a week later. Meinhof was arrested two weeks later when a connection she 
was staying with turned her in. Since the police did not have fingerprints to identify her, 
the prosecutor and judge agreed to have an x-ray of Meinhof’s head, so the clamp 
implanted in her brain from a previous surgery could be used to identify her. Meinhof 
                                                
3 The Frankfurter Rundschau reported the possibility of this text being fake, but three 
days later it was reported on the front cover. “Unklarheit über neue Terror-Drohungen.” 
Frankfurter Rundschau. May 29, 1972.  
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was forcibly anaesthetized because she refused to be x-rayed (Aust 2008: 233), turning 
this into be the first of many acts the State chose to impose upon the members without 
their consent.   
 The incarcerated RAF members were dispersed across several prisons in the 
Federal Republic. Meinhof was sent to an isolation cell at Ossendorf prison in Cologne, 
where she lived “practically twenty-four hours a day in an unlivable environment” (Krebs 
1988: 241), and stated, “gas; I tell you that my Auschwitz fantasies are coming to life” in 
a letter to Mahler (Peters 2004: 306). Other RAF prisoners conducted hunger strikes 
between May 1973 and February 1974 to show solidarity with their goal of ending 
solitary confinement, supervised visits, an end to censorship of the prisoners’ mail, and to 
all be moved into a common prison (Bauer 2008: 79). The prison responded with a court 
order to force feed the prisoners. In November 1974, Meins died due to the third hunger 
strike. Graphic pictures of Meins’ six foot, eighty-eight pound body and sunken eyes 
were released by the RAF’s lawyer, Groenewold (Terhoeven 2007: 392), to be the 
headlines of liberal newspapers such as Die Zeit, and a cover story of the hunger strikes 
appeared in Der Spiegel to question the treatment of prisoners in Stammheim. A widely 
circulated photograph shows Meins’ corpse dressed in a white silk gown, Photograph 4, 
with sunken eyes and cheeks. In the photograph, Meins “appears as a Christ-like figure, 
an ascetic who had given his life for the cause” (Meinhof 2008: 80). Meins’ starved 
corpse, pictured in Photographs 3 and 4, also drew parallels to victims of concentration 
camps, and with the cultural trauma of such events having occurred less than forty years 
earlier, Meins’ death increased sympathy for the RAF.  
 The Stammheim trial was the longest and most expensive trial in the history of the 
Federal Republic. Lasting 192 days, the trial ended with the alleged suicides of the  
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members (Passmore 2011: 83). Reports of the trial described it as a “catastrophe for the 
democratic state” (Wesel 2006: 1057) due to the new anti-terror laws passed that made it 
easier for the State to prosecute citizens involved in terrorist activities. The new legal 
construct of the “criminal association” (kriminelle Vereinigung, section 129 of the 
criminal code) stated that each member of the RAF was to be tried separately (Oesterle 
2003: 125). This is meant that the RAF needed to alter their defense strategy. The RAF 
chose to not follow the initial goal of the trial- to prosecute the members for their violent 
actions- and used the trial as a platform to rationalize their actions with their ideology. 
They constructed their message in two ways: as a ‘political prisoner’ and as a ‘prisoner of 
war’ (POW). At the beginning, the trial was delayed because of several attempts by 
doctors to establish whether the prisoners were fit to stand trial due to their declining 
health from the hunger strikes. The fitness to stand trial (Verhandlungsfähigkeit) was 
discussed by Groenwold in interviews. It was described in an info from June 16, 1973 
under the sub-headline “hunger strike,” that Meinhof “underwent detailed examinations 
of blood and urine. She was declared sick, which meant the trial was cancelled with no 
free time, or visits” (GFA, Box #: 362, File: 3168 (pp. 290)). Also, it is important to note 
that the trial would continue if the defendant refused the trial, but “if someone is sick and 
therefore cannot come, the court cannot proceed, if someone is sick for longer than 10 
days, the trial would be temporarily shut down” (GFA, Box #: 362, File: 3166 (pp. 7-8)). 
The lawyers feared too that members would be declared mentally ill and ‘unfit’ for trial. 
The strategy of invoking the status of a political prisoner and prisoner of war turned into 
a human rights violation issue, demanding fair treatment by the Federal Republic. This 
too caused an increase in public sympathy for the RAF.  
 When Judge Prinzing appeared on a television interview claiming that the trial 
was a “normal criminal trial” (normaler Straffall) rather than a political trial (Aust 2008: 
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361), this furthered the RAF’s representation of a conspiracy of the State trying to reduce 
their legitimacy as an organization (HIfS, Box #: U/025, File: 007 (1975-6)). The 
prisoners then turned to claiming that they were political prisoners, and their lawyers 
filed an application to the European Commission of Human Rights. The complaint was 
centered “around prison conditions and isolation suffered by ‘political prisoners’, the 
exclusion of defense counsel, as well as the assertion that through these conditions the 
‘authorities [had] created a class of political prisoners whose rights [were] reduced in 
comparison to the other prisoners” (1975: 59); and the commission was forced to rule 
whether the decisions of the Federal Republic violated articles 3, 6, 8, and 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Passmore 2011: 96). During this time, the 
media published reports sympathetic to the organization. New protests regarding 
prisoners’ rights occurred across the Federal Republic. The strategy of calling the 
members ‘prisoners of war’ was not as successful. First, the audience needed to 
understand and agree with the RAF’s revolutionary goals. Then, the audience had to view 
the RAF prisoners as being held captive by the oppressive State. The historic imagery of 
a prisoner of war, though, did speak to the public, but not as well as the claims of being a 
‘political prisoner.’  
Deaths at Stammheim  
 The reported ‘suicides’ of Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe flooded the 
headlines with conspiracy theories and protests against the Federal Republic that 
increased sympathy for the organization for years to follow. In Dr. Meyer’s report for the 
International Investigation Commission (IUK) in 1979 he states, “The lack of a suicide 
note is pivotal. In my opinion, it is definitive evidence against suicide and is contrary to 
every else we know about her [Meinhof]…For Ulrike Meinhof to commit suicide without 
leaving a suicide note is impossible” (2007: 34-5). Now known as the ‘Stammheim 
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Myth’, the suicides of Raspe, Baader, Ensslin, and Meinhof inspired many conspiracy 
theories, undermining the credibility of the Federal Republic. Below is a chart indicating 
aspects of the deaths due to conspiracies.  
RAF Member  Date of Death Cause of Death Conspiracy 
Holger Meins November 9, 1974 Starvation None- became a 
martyr for protests 
against harsh prison 
conditions.  
Ulrike Meinhof May 9, 1976 Suicide- Hanging Body position 
showed difficulty in 
hanging by oneself. 
Dried semen found 
on body after 
examined, and 
concluded as being 
raped before death.   
Andreas Baader October 18, 1977 Suicide- Gunshot  Gunshots were 
sporadic, and 
ballistic expert 
claims that body had 
to be at a distance 
for the wounds 
inflicted- unless the 
gun had a silencer. 
A silencer was not 
found in the cell.   
Gudrun Ensslin October 18, 1977 Suicide-Hanging Body position was 
similar to Meinhof’s 
whereas one’s own 
hanging could be 
questioned as not 
being able to do this 
by themself.  
 
Jan-Carl Raspe  October 18, 1977 Suicide- Gunshot No gunpowder 
residue was found 
on Raspe, or in his 
cell.  
Irmgard Möller October 18, 1977 Suicide- Stabbing No fingerprints were 
found on knife she 
was holding at her 
death, and it was as 
if someone wiped it 
clean.  
 
 Meinhof committed suicide over a year before the other members in 1976, after 
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she was declared unfit to stand trial. The RAF prisoners ostracized her, and refused to 
include her in their plans, while Ensslin took over her job as lead communicator. Ensslin, 
Baader, Möller, and Raspe were found in their cells on the morning of October 18, 1977, 
which implied acts of suicide. Later known as the ‘Death Night’, the prisoners were seen 
as martyrs for their cause, inspiring more sympathy for the new generations of the RAF. 
The mass exodus of the core members started a new era for protest and dissent against the 
Federal Republic, and left the RAF to feed off of the resentment citizens gained after the 
core members’ deaths.  
The German Autumn  
 Starting in 1975, the RAF transitioned their mission to freeing the prisoners, and 
correlated their attacks with claims against a corrupt justice and prison system. Events of 
the German Autumn would not have occurred if the prisoners were not able to contact 
members of the organization outside of jail. Prisoners struggled with maintaining a 
revolutionary morale when judges censored books and mail sent to the prisoners. Klaus 
Croissant, one of the RAF’s defense attorneys, described that subjects such as “the 
detonation of explosive devices, means of preventing such devices being de-activated, on 
recent police methods of hunting suspects, on new weapons, alarm systems, industrial 
security forces, miniaturized spying devices, the construction of police roadblocks” (Aust 
2008: 265) were accumulated in their library to maintain a ‘revolutionary consciousness.’ 
Their ability to smuggle into prison this information demonstrated that “the fight can be 
continued from a prison cell, and that the terrorist organization can continue to function 
despite the authorities’ efforts to break it” (Wright 1990: 147). Near the end of 1976, 
police recovered photographs of the inside of Stammheim and of the prisoners 
themselves in an apartment of the known sympathizer Elisabeth von Dyck. This provided 
evidence that items such as cameras, guns, and secret messages had the ability to be 
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smuggled in. Furthermore, the police used this evidence to infer that the weapons Ensslin, 
Baader, and Raspe used for their suicides were smuggled items from their lawyers. 
Having this ability within the prison system “enabled the prisoners themselves to 
continue the operational planning, and for the outside leadership to include the prisoners 
in operational plans, even if none of these plans actually eventuated” (Wright 1990: 147).  
The German Autumn began on July 30, 1977 with the attempted kidnapping and 
killing of the director of Dresdner Bank, Jürgen Ponto. The RAF’s terror lasted until 
October 18, 1977, and was their last major terrorist act. During this time the Chairman of 
the German Employer’s Federation, Hans Martin Schleyer, was kidnapped, and a 
Lufthansa flight, LH 181, was hijacked with 87 people. Its passengers were taken hostage 
and a demand was issued for the remaining RAF prisoners at Stammheim to be set free. 
The Second Generation’s plans were poorly executed, leaving the plane to be returned, 
and Schleyer was shot to avenge the deaths of Meinhof, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe. 
Instead of the initial ploy to gain public support for the organization, the actions during 
the German Autumn caused the public to view the new generations as sporadic, immature 
radicals.  
Terror Coming to an End 
 In the first two years of their operation, the core members of the RAF were 
captured, and in less than seven years the core members were all dead. The RAF lasted 
twenty-eight years, but the mission and self-portrayal of the organization never was the 
same after 1977. The Second and Third Generation members were untrained 
Baader/Meinhof wannabes whose message failed to reach the West German public. 
Instead, they latched onto the support of the sympathizers from the deaths of the core 
members until their ideology became irrelevant. No other German terrorist organization 
could rival RAF during the 1970s. The media turned to mocking the Second and Third 
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Generations as kids and bank robbers, thus pushing them towards dissolving the 
organization as a whole in 1998.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Degrees of Sympathy toward Terrorist Organizations 
 
 
“Though sympathy alone can't alter facts, it can help to make them more bearable.”  
―Bram Stoker, Dracula 
 
In her book Terrorist Propaganda  (1990), Joanne Wright discusses how 
propaganda affects three different types of audiences “uncommitted,” “sympathetic,” and 
“active”. Wright’s categories provide a base for those who sympathize with terrorist 
actions in correlation to the organization’s propaganda. But there are other factors that 
increase sympathy for terrorist organizations. After laying out the conditions for 
sympathetic tendencies of the public in the first two chapters (namely, historical factors, 
personal recognition, and the role of the media), sympathetic tendencies toward terrorist 
organizations are multifaceted.    
Instead of defining propaganda as “tools for creating public support in the pursuit 
of political ends” (Wright 1990: 73), we should also focus on terrorist propaganda as a 
means of targeting sociocultural and political factors. Scholars such as Wright tend to 
focus on one factor rather than approaching a case multifariously. Therefore, NATO’s 
definition of propaganda in its Glossary of Terms for Military Use is applied when 
discussing sympathetic origins and potentialities of sympathetic attitudes toward the 
terrorist organizations. NATO defines propaganda as “any information, ideas, doctrines 
or special appeals disseminated to influence opinion, emotions, attitudes or behavior of 
any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly” (1974: 2-
176). This definition does not imply that terrorism has the ability to gain public support, 
but that the terror brought about by an organization influences an individuals’ thoughts, 
actions, and emotive behavior in society. The violence conducted by terrorist 
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organizations is key to separating such groups from simple social movements. Violence 
lays the groundwork for what they consider to be “true change.” This definition is 
distinguishable from communication and persuasion, whereas the goal of propaganda “is 
to satisfy or further the needs of the propagandist” (Wright 1990: 73). The propagandists 
though have to twist their message to fit the experiences of their audience. Turning to 
Jacques Ellul’s term, “pre-propaganda”, the historical turmoil of a German citizen, makes 
“him sensitive to some influence” (1969: 30), thus making the RAF’s claims more 
persuasive to the West German audience.   
The organization’s strategy with print media in the Federal Republic was vital to 
its overall goal. Reading the news is a morning ritual for Germans. Taking part in reading 
news is “performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull” (Eisenstein 1968: 42), but 
this ritual is “being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others” 
(Anderson 1983: 35). Through their propaganda, the RAF was able to communicate with 
a common language that spoke to West German citizens’ leftist imagined communities 
that desired political and social change. Meinhof’s rhetoric skewed the reality of West 
German society to gain support for the RAF’s cause. The radicalized West German left 
“self-consciously defined themselves” (Anderson 1983: 46) by taking action against the 
Federal Republic, whether it was through physical or private dissent, and the RAF’s 
message resonated within a substantial part of West German consciousness.    
I propose to organize the audiences of terrorist propaganda into the following five 
categories: hyperactive sympathizer, active sympathizer, passive sympathizer, hyper-
passive sympathizer, and disassociators (i.e., those who actively disassociate from the 
ideology of a terrorist organization.) A hyperactive sympathizer is an individual, 
described by H.J. Horchem in The Development of West German Terrorism. After 1969: 
An Overview, as one who provides a constant supply of money, false identities, safe 
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houses, cars, and anything that would prevent capture of a member of the organization 
(1983: 13). The hyperactive sympathizer is also an individual who Stefan Aust describes 
as a “connection” (Aust 2008: 78), meaning as an individual who is willing to serve jail 
time for protecting a member of an organization. Several of these “connections” were 
from Meinhof’s previous contacts as a journalist at konkret. An active sympathizer 
supports the organization through advocacy or participating in protests. The active 
sympathizer does not cross the line of volunteering to help the organization but will hand 
out pamphlets or attend protests. The passive sympathizer is an individual who believes 
in the ideology of the organization but chooses to not support the organization in the 
public realm. A hyper-passive sympathizer is one who is aware of the organization’s 
ideology but does not support or disassociate from it. An individual who actively 
disassociates from the organization is the least willing to sympathize with the 
organization because the disassociator does not believe in the ideology of the 
organization.  
West Germany’s media coverage of the RAF divided the public into these five 
categories, during the twenty-eight years during which the RAF existed that country. 
Hyperactive and active sympathizers go above and beyond to gain information about the 
RAF, and chose to physically involve themselves in the public sphere. On the other hand, 
passive and hyper-passive sympathizers formulated their opinions based on media 
reporting, and their level of sympathy fluctuated depending on the RAF’s current act of 
terror at the time. Citizens who disassociated from the organization exhibited no desire to 
support the radicalized leftist ideology, and viewed the RAF’s actions as silly and 
childish. A further explanation of the five categories is provided below, starting with the 
highest level of sympathy, hyperactive sympathizers, and concluding with the lowest 
level of sympathy, the disassociators.  
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Hyperactive Sympathizers 
In order to have a successful terrorist organization, members must have a solid 
base of supporters willing to do anything in their cause. A hyperactive sympathizer then 
is one who chooses to commit illegal acts to advance the goals of the organization. An 
individual who reaches this level of sympathy is most likely an individual who connects 
to the message of the organization, and judges that the outcome will justify the means of 
the organization. Although the individual does not partake in the extreme violent acts, a 
hyperactive sympathizer is a valuable asset in keeping the members safe and/or funded. 
Therefore the only outside individuals that active members of the organization come into 
contact with are the hyperactive sympathizers – of which the RAF had around 200 at the 
time (Bougereau 1981: 71).  
A hyperactive sympathizer is a product of a variety of factors, including sharing 
the West German cultural trauma of the Nazi past and distaste for the new post-war 
governments. The RAF’s message spoke the most to this audience, as the sympathizers 
actively looked for new propaganda from the organization. Hyperactive sympathizers 
also may know someone directly in the organization, and have a personal relationship 
with them. Meinhof had the strongest connections from her journalist past at the 
beginning of the RAF’s formation, and used her knowledge of the radical left 
sympathizers to hide Baader and Ensslin after Baader was broken out of jail in 1970 
(Passmore 2011: 34). Having an operating system is key for any terrorist organization, 
but there runs a fine line between the organization’s message and its actions. The RAF 
produced a plethora of rationales for their actions, but support began to fall because its 
“actions did not produce the results its theory predicted” (Wright 1990: 144). Instead of 
tapping into the ‘revolutionary consciousness’ of West German citizens, the RAF’s 
violent acts left this target audience critical of the organization. If the ‘propaganda of the 
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deed’ is not successful, support will be lost, and then sympathizers will refuse to 
rationalize the acts of the organization.  
Hyperactive sympathy can increase with the intentional or unintentional 
projection of a terrorist organization by the media. Liberal media outlets such as Der 
Spiegel, Die Zeit, konkret, and the Frankfurter Rundschau reported differently than 
popular conservative media like the Bild Zeitung. While most newspapers reported the 
RAF’s declarations verbatim, the declarations were presented in a negative light (Elter 
2008: 123-125), and published after the bombings occurred. The RAF would produce 
constant rationales to assure sympathizers that they had no intention to harm the ordinary 
citizen. To maintain support, a terrorist organization must be conscious of their social 
image to keep a base of hyperactive supporters. This is confirmed when Horst Mahler, a 
lawyer connected to the formation of the RAF, stated “we were quite aware of the fact 
that if we wanted to fight with arms it would be necessary to kill… Of course, it was not 
‘the people’, the little man who is innocent [of] any repression that we would kill. The 
main point of our struggle was to be some kind of sabotage and punishment of 
responsible personages for cruelties against the people” (Kellen 1979: 33). 
Communication between the hyperactive sympathizers and the terrorist organization is 
vital to the success of the organization. When the RAF was portrayed as watered down 
criminals who had no intention to advance their political goal, their first act as an 
organization was to rob three banks. They struggled to communicate their view that their 
act was part of a larger plan: “Many people say that a bank robbery is not political. But, 
financing a political organization is a political question. This is how you solve the 
revolutionary organization’s financial problem. It is right because the financial problem 
could not be solved in any other way. It is tactically right because it is a proletarian 
action. It is also strategically right because it serves the purpose of financing the 
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guerillas” (Wagenlehner 1978: 196). The three main components of maintaining 
hyperactive sympathizers, therefore, are 1- creating an ideology that relates to the 
citizens; 2- communicating to the citizens the organization’s actions, and 3- being 
conscious of how the media portrays the organization. If an organization is able to focus 
on these three components, a strong group of hyperactive sympathizers will be 
maintained.  
Active Sympathizers 
  An active sympathizer of a terrorist organization shares similar qualities of a 
hyperactive supporter, but does not have the face-to-face interaction with the 
organization. Active sympathizers attend rallies, protests, and hand out pamphlets in 
support of the organization or its ideology. While the hyperactive sympathizer is vital for 
the operations of the organization, the organization needs active sympathizers to keep the 
message alive. The organization can commit extreme acts, but the public show of support 
is crucial for popularizing the message.  
The active sympathizer is like a hyperactive supporter, except that the active 
sympathizer may not want to be directly involved with the organization for fear of 
criminal charges. An active supporter receives direct propaganda from the organization, 
but also relies on the media for information. To instill the communication into its 
sympathizers, the RAF published their declarations – that later turned into an anthology 
entitled Treatise on Method, to be found in leftist bookshops (Passmore 2011: 43). 
Sympathizers were able to read in detail about their rationales rather than getting them 
from the negative statements in the newspapers.  
Passive Sympathizers 
The organization’s ideological appeal to passive sympathizers is done by 
presenting the state as disadvantaging a particular group of individuals on a daily basis. 
 38 
This creates the ability for citizens to “attack the credibility of the state and security 
forces” (Wright 1990: 79), and begins a process Tugwell describes as “guilt transfer”, 
whereby citizens blame the outcome of a terrorist act on the state (1976-7). The Federal 
Republic fell victim to the “guilt transfer” when citizens protested against the state for 
oppressive security measures, such as the Emergency Laws, to capture the RAF. In turn, 
the organization’s violent actions were seen a “reaction to the oppressive conditions 
within the state” (Wright 1990: 79).  
Passive sympathizers still have the possibility of being persuaded to sympathize 
for the organization by the media’s portrayal of the organization. This was exemplified 
during the hunger strikes of the RAF members imprisoned in Stammheim, and the death 
of Meins in the winter of 1974. During the trial, pictures of Meins’ starved body was 
published on every newspaper’s front page, and leftist media analogized it to the 
treatment to the victims of the Holocaust. RAF lawyers turned this issue into a human 
rights question that increased support of the organization and began protests for prison 
reform during 1975. The picture of Meins was vital to show the audience the brutality of 
the State, and gained sympathy for the members by humanizing each starved member. 
Media stunts like the hunger strike are able to persuade the uninformed audience to 
sympathize for their cause.  
The final strategy for gaining passive sympathy for the organization was by 
linking itself to a larger cause. This could be something that connected the mission of the 
organization to serving a greater humanitarian purpose, and rationalized their violence in 
a positive scope. Several radical left terrorist organizations in the 1970s, from Cuba to 
Germany, associated themselves with each other all over the world by advocating their 
support for a variety of causes. The RAF claimed in a statement to Der Spiegel that “it is 
silly to attribute to us the intent to be the sole actors of urban guerilla warfare, given the 
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contemporary state of several anti-imperialist battles in Asia, Latin America, Africa, in 
Vietnam, Chile, Uruguay, and in Argentina. There are also groups in Western Europe 
engaged in armed combat in Italy, in Portugal, and in England” (1975: 55-6). This 
statement was to “give the impression that the RAF was part of a global attack against 
imperialism and colonialism; that it was already part of a mass-movement which 
unreservedly supported its actions” (Wright 1990: 87). Linking their mission to other 
organizations with similar goals validated the RAF’s claims of oppression by the state, 
and this formulated a visual comparison that citizens could read about in the news.  
For passive sympathizers, ideological and historically tied propaganda has a direct 
affect on their view of an organization. As they do not have a firm opinion of the 
organization, their minds are malleable, and left to be persuaded by media and 
propaganda to form an opinion.  
Hyper-Passive Sympathizers  
A hyper-passive sympathizer may purchase leftist newspapers, and support the 
ideology. Hyper-passive sympathizers choose to not support the ideology in the public 
realm because they do not want to be characterized as a radical. It is vital for an 
organization to keep a good social image in the media to maintain their hyper-passive 
sympathizers. If the organization creates persuasive propaganda, the hyper-passive 
sympathizer can transition into a passive or even an active sympathizer.  
Hyper-passive sympathy occurred throughout West Germany when Marxism was 
a popular form of thought, and taught at German universities. A hyper-passive 
sympathizer looks down upon the organization for their violent actions against the State. 
Heinrich Böll critiques the RAF for their actions after he received backlash from the 
West German government for his sympathetic novel, The Lost Honor of Katharina 
Bloom. Böll’s novel exposed the media’s methods of reporting through the story of 
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Katharina Bloom’s ruined life. By mimicking Bild Zeitung’s reporting, his sympathetic 
novel depicts the monstrosity of the media’s twisting of words just to receive more 
readers in a capitalist society that valued revenue over the truth. Böll spoke out several 
times about the RAF by criticizing their work, and Meinhof responded with several 
remarks about how leftist intellectuals need to stop hiding away with their typewriters 
and join the fight. This pushed the RAF to the position that “The polarization is simply 
clear: Either anti-imperialist struggle, for the guerilla, internationalism or in the ass of the 
government, state security, Springer Press” (Bakker Schut 1987). Members of the RAF 
viewed sympathy and support of their organization as either ‘for or against’, and ignored 
the role of the hyper-passive sympathizers. 
Disassociators  
These individuals would never be ‘converted’ to the cause of the organization. In 
the Federal Republic, the older generation and some post-World War II generations 
criticized the RAF and its followers. Individuals who actively disassociated from the 
organization believed in a traditional lifestyle, rejecting the freedoms of the 1960s and 
1970s. Their views of communism were negative, and they feared the kind of ideology 
that was capable of turning West Germany into East Germany. The Federal Republic’s 
new ‘democratic’ values had brought economic prosperity to West Germans, and 
stepping back from this was unimaginable. Two thematically similar ‘good-versus-evil 
fights’ were being fought at this time. The international realm was split between two 
ideologies during the Cold War: Communism and Capitalist democracy. If citizens in the 
Federal Republic did not support the new democratic values, they were labeled as 
radicals, leftist snobs and ultimately, pro-Communist. The RAF waged a new war that 
furthered the theme of good versus evil by portraying the Federal Republic as an 
oppressive state, and asserting that the only way to purify the State was to get rid of the 
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current government. Already suffering from enough change, it was plausible for older 
West Germans to reject the mission of the RAF. Besides, associating with the terrorist 
organization would paint a target on a citizen’s back and individuals could be prosecuted 
for their support.  
The Cool Terrorists 
The RAF presented as a ‘chic’ version of terrorism. Its members were seen as 
‘celebrity’ terrorists. Their appearance in the media created a rollercoaster of support that 
influenced the organization’s actions throughout the 1970s. A small percentage of those 
citizens chose to radicalize, and become sympathizers or hyperactive sympathizers to the 
RAF, while others continued to be passive sympathizers of their ideology. The 
generational differences in interpreting post-World War II events caused rifts in the 
dissent of the Federal Republic, both among dissenters who to varying degrees criticized 
the FRG and between dissenters and those who to varying degrees supported the ideology 
of post-war governments.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
“Society cannot share a common communication system so long as it is split into 
warring factions” 
—Bertolt Brecht4 
 
 
 Social scientists have long maintained that crime serves several societal functions 
(Tunnell 1992: 296). In a classical Durkheimian sense, crime serves as a necessity that 
reinforces moral boundaries and socially acceptable behavior (Durkheim 1933). The RAF 
became a failed experiment after the death of their core members in 1977. Their 
organization’s disbanding is a failure of the organization, but their message continues to 
live on. Following the Merriam Webster Dictionary’s definition of success as “a 
favorable or desired outcome,” the RAF’s ideological and violent war against the Federal 
Republic prompted its citizens to critique the government and agitate for greater social 
change. Their violent acts led to the creation of laws to instill national security. A survey 
distributed by the Allensbach Institute in 1971, at the beginning of the RAF’s formation, 
found that twenty-five percent of Germans under the age of thirty sympathized with the 
RAF, and five percent of German citizens were willing to let an RAF member spend the 
night in their home (Koenen 2001: 392). With such a large support group, the RAF was 
able to force change across the Federal Republic. Although the organization’s support 
continued to rise and fall over the years, the RAF paved a path to a new era of politics 
and cultural freedom in the Federal Republic. 
The organization’s message in relation to the media is vital for its survival. The 
organization is unable to gain sympathy and support for its cause unless its propaganda 
connects with its audience. While the media plays a crucial role in an organization’s 
                                                4	From Brecht’s play, "Kleines Organon für das Theater" (1949: 55).  
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success, organizations are also “dependent on many factors, such as moral disposition, 
peer pressure, life experiences, individual analysis, and educational levels” (Wright 1990: 
102-3). These factors can originate in historical events or poor political decisions that, in 
the case of Germany, crippled its national consciousness, leaving it vulnerable to a 
subversive social discourse. In his article “The Political Socialization of West German 
Terrorists”, Klaus Wasmund asks “Is terrorism possible in a country where law and order 
and a marked sense of conformity and obedience were considered for a long time to be 
the highest values? Is terrorism, then, a paradox within German political culture?” (1986: 
191-228). This thesis does not answer Wasmund’s question, but turns to the historical 
fact that there is no tradition of terrorism in Germany. The State overreacted to terrorism, 
thus creating an atmosphere for citizens to sympathize with the RAF. A student who 
joined the organization, Ulli Scholze, describes how easy it was for the group to recruit 
new members at that time: “A certain psychological disposition is a pre-condition of 
joining” (Aust 2008: 91). Further, he describes how “You have to be emotionally 
convinced that all attempts at reform simply stabilize the present system of society and 
consolidate capitalism. And the harmony of reason and emotions, which then exists, is 
the pre-condition of resolute action. Then the prosecuting authorities put pressure on you, 
and that confirms all you thought. And the sensational press reports and descriptions such 
as ‘Public Enemy Number 1’ from government sources create a feeling of success that 
gives you the strength to carry on” (Aust 2008: 91). Scholze’s observations about the 
organization represent the consciousness of many students, who were in support of the 
Student Movement, and then began to sympathize with the RAF.  
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Historical Factors  
Post-Nazi Germany was left in devastation after the Second World War. Life 
changing decisions about the State were made by other nations with little input from 
German citizens. The total collapse of Germany’s market, starvation, defeat, and forced 
‘joint’ leadership over an occupied and divided Germany led to its citizens experiencing 
trauma. In his article, “Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change,” Pitor 
Sztompka discusses cultural trauma as a catalyst for an individual’s desire for social and 
cultural change. In a Durkheimian sense trauma is a social fact, and hence a shared 
consciousness among individuals. Trauma then is, “a collective phenomenon, a condition 
experienced by a group, community, or society, as a result of disruptive events culturally 
interpreted as traumatizing” (Sztompka 2000: 458). Historical events laid out in the first 
chapter are interpreted as traumatizing events that leave some West German citizens 
prone to sympathize for individuals who ‘fight’ for a better State.  
According to Sztompka, conditions for cultural trauma stem from a 
“disorganization, displacement, or incoherence in [a] culture” (2000: 453). “Cultural 
disorientation” then is the origin for cultural trauma, and it occurs when “some 
significant, sudden and unexpected episode of social change gives a blow to the very 
central assumptions of a culture, or more precisely is interpreted as fundamentally 
incongruent with the core values, bases of identity, foundations of collective pride, etc.” 
(Sztompka 2000: 453). The initial ‘blow’ to the German psyche is the first occurrence of 
dissociation when Germany was defeated in the Second World War, and later split up by 
Russia, Great Britain, France, and the United States to ensure that something like World 
War II would never happen again. Their psyche was crushed, and Germans were forced 
to eliminate their past through denazification processes and other means to forget their 
Nazi past. This occurred again once East Germany built the wall surrounding West Berlin 
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to keep out capitalist ideas and values. Germans also shared collective memories of 
association with the Holocaust. The collective deeds violating accepted cultural 
principles (Roth 1995) brought feelings of shame and the pledge to never repeat their 
actions. Second, West Germans experienced a ‘cultural clash’ (Sztompka 2000: 454) 
when American products and lifestyles emerged in the 1950s that challenged traditional 
German lifestyles. Meinhof emphasized this during the Student Movement, when many 
saw the Federal Republic as just a puppet regime governed by the United States, which 
did not adhere to the desires of West German citizens. Third, cultural disorientation 
occurs with “sudden, unexpected and wide-ranging novelty of unaccustomed ways of 
life, emerging due to radically changed technological, economic, or political conditions” 
(Sztompka 2000: 454). Such cultural disorientation appears in the Federal Republic as 
generational conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s, with differing opinions on sexual lifestyles, 
careers, art, education, clothing, living situations and many other issues. The clash of 
traditional lifestyles with new lifestyles created more cultural disorientation. And fourth, 
cultural disorientation may occur “by a reinterpretation of the past” (Sztompka 2000: 
455). The younger generation in West Germany spoke out against the older generation, 
holding them responsible for the lack of protest against the fascist regime. Instead of 
sharing what occurred during the National Socialist period, the older generation chose to 
not share their past with younger generations. This led the younger generation to interpret 
the events for themselves. Cultural disorientation does not necessarily turn into cultural 
trauma. Trauma occurs only when such events are “perceived and experienced” as 
unresolvable issues. The trauma perceived then “touches the core of collective order- the 
domain of main values, constitutive rules, central expectations” (Sztompka 2000: 457), 
causing the desire to not repeat the past to manifest itself in pathological ways.  
Sztompka emphasizes that cultural trauma is “most threatening because like all 
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cultural phenomena it has the strongest inertia; it persists and lingers considerably longer 
than other kinds of trauma, sometimes over several generations, preserved in collective 
memory or hibernating in collective sub-consciousness, and occasionally gaining salience 
when conducive circumstances arise” (2000: 458). In the 1960s, the generational 
differences in opinions on education and social equality became an outcry for social 
justice in West Germany. Confronting the past to reform the State was an issue that the 
older generation chose not to address. Protests and grievances against the Federal 
Republic radicalized after the State ignored the outcries for change. The fear of the State 
falling back into fascism was a trauma that some citizens clearly anticipated. This fear in 
some cases translated into violent action, or its tacit support, among the youth. Formation 
of terrorist organizations was an extreme outcome of German cultural trauma, but its 
ideological basis was something that many Germans supported at the time.  
The Importance of the Media and Public Perception  
Meinhof’s interpretation of Germany’s National Socialist past was an integral part 
of the RAF’s message in saving the nation from another fascist regime. Her rhetoric 
addressed the cultural trauma experienced by Germans, and spun their pain into the fear 
of repeating the past. The challenge, though, was to transform fear into action, 
specifically violent action against the State, to force change. In a typical revolutionary 
communistic way, the RAF resorted to extreme actions to force the enlightenment of 
citizens that would view the Federal Republic as a repressive regime. Chapter Two 
addresses the vital role of the media in the RAF’s success in spreading their message to 
West German citizens in key events such as the May Offensive, the hunger strikes, deaths 
of the core members, and the German Autumn. The relationship between the media and 
the RAF serves as a crucial part of the organization’s survival, as their message continued 
to be spread to active and passive sympathizers, discussed in the third chapter, during 
 47 
their existence.  
 The May Offensive was the first true attack the RAF planned against the Federal 
Republic. Instead of gaining more support, the RAF lost sympathy once citizens were 
being killed. The media published pictures of the bombings with references to war 
destruction as a strategy to persuade the West German audience to view the organization 
as criminals rather than revolutionaries. Meinhof’s rhetoric remained true to their goals, 
and provided transparent communication between the citizens and the organization. The 
hunger strikes and the brutality of the police sparked sympathy for the organization as 
photographs were being shared of the members in starvation. Meins’ death inspired the 
organization to describe conditions as if they were in concentration camps, and 
presenting themselves as political prisoners of the State instead of terrorists inspired 
protests against the treatment of prisoners in the Federal Republic. Conspiracy theories 
Meinhof’s death pointing towards the government being involved further show the lack 
of faith West German citizens had in their government to uphold the law. Less than a 
year later, the deaths of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe sparked new protests and conspiracy 
theories about a corrupt government. Even after death, the core members were able to 
execute their strategy of forcing the hand of the state to expose what they saw as the 
government’s subtle fascist tendencies. The German Autumn ended the steady stream of 
sympathy for the organization as the second and third generations of the terrorist 
organizations were perceived as wreckless youths, and as lost without their core 
members. These events, and the perception of them published in the media, influenced 
West German citizens to sympathize with the organization in the 1970s.  
 The media’s role in the rise and fall of sympathy for the organization was tested 
after the first terrorist-level attacks were executed in West Germany. Though the media 
did not favor radical left propaganda, the liberal media was not as harsh as the 
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conservative Springer press (Bild Zeitung) at the time. More liberal media chose to 
critique the organization while the conservative media chose to publish reports 
demonizing the members, and provided psychological explanations for their deviant 
activities to dissolve any sympathy citizens would feel for the organization. Ray Surette 
describes in his work, Justice and the Media, that reporters who characterize criminals 
and their actions as psychological rather than social in nature tend to increase fear in the 
public sphere (1984). Bild Zeitung practiced reporting strategies such as this, for instance 
in articles blaming Meinhof’s earlier brain surgery for her radicalization and becoming an 
unfit mother. The media, in some sense, played God when choosing how to report events. 
Their agenda of crushing the public support for the organization partially reflected in 
reverse the RAF’s propaganda to influence the public consciousness.  
Romanticizing a ‘Revolutionary’ Cause  
As compelling as their message was at the time, the RAF retained an aura 
composed of revolutionary and spy-like lifestyles that appealed to younger Germans at 
the time. Uli Scholze describes how quick an individual can become a member of the 
organization, “You slip outside the law very fast, he said. First an interested party is 
asked to find an apartment, then he may help with a car theft, and it’s not far from that to 
a bank raid” (Aust 2008: 91). Scholze’s path to radicalization relates to the traits of a 
hyperactive supporter discussed in the third chapter. Few rose to this level of support, and 
while many West German citizens became hyper-passive and passive supporters of the 
organization’s cause.  
 The RAF glamorized their revolutionary cause through Meinhof’s writings, and 
public perception of the media. Their quest for a better West Germany was easy for 
citizens to romanticize, as their violence was targeted at a specific group of individuals, 
the Federal Republic, and provided a simple ‘good versus evil’ rhetoric for the citizens to 
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comprehend in the organization’s propaganda. The romanticizing of the RAF during this 
time can also be described by Yaacov Trope’s term “mental distancing” (Trope 2003: 
403-421). Trope describes this phenomenon when individuals separate themselves from 
emotions, people, events, or concepts. Distancing can come naturally: as painful 
memories are pushed into the past, our emotions weaken and the perception of the events 
softens. Other times, individuals need to physically distance themselves to gain 
perspective on the event (Wakslak 2006: 641). Once individuals attain ‘mental 
distancing’, they are able to feel nostalgia and romanticize events by filtering the harsher 
details, and emphasizing the ones that are more desirable. Hyper-passive and passive 
sympathizers for a terrorist organization are able to provide a reasonable distance by not 
personally affiliating themselves with the organization. By supporting the ideology, these 
sympathizers romanticize the organization’s cause through private support. In turn, the 
individuals choose to focus on the rationale for the attacks rather than the physical attacks 
themselves. These individuals are the silent killers of society, as they will not act against 
the organization to aid the State because “Criminals…do for us the forbidden, illegal 
things we wish to do” (Menninger 1966: 157). 
Victims of the Federal Republic 
 In 1977, the RAF’s core members became martyrs for their cause, gaining 
sympathy for the organization. Criminal victimization theories such as “victim 
precipitation,” where individuals judge the criminal’s actions as a result of their past, 
(Wolfgang 1958) or “lifestyle-exposure,” where individuals judge the criminal’s actions 
as a result of what is occurring in contemporary society, (Hindelang 1978) appear to be a 
weaker explanation for the levels of sympathy for the RAF. The organization’s lawyers 
focused their legal strategy on the RAF’s cause rather than using their personal history as 
an explanation for their actions. The West German public responded to the media’s 
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reporting on current actions of the RAF, rather than attacks on their personal lives. 
Citizens were able to ignore the victimization core members of the organization during 
their time at Stammheim. The press continued to publish headlines and photographs 
showing the harsh prison conditions imposed upon the organization that were mandated 
by the State. Their original message was so strong that it swept the RAF’s violent actions 
under the rug while citizens focused on the Federal Republic’s treatment of the 
imprisoned members. Claims of ‘political prisoner’ and ‘prisoner of war’ status struck a 
chord with the citizens, as they brought vivid memories of World War II and the Vietnam 
War. The connection between these meanings inspired protests and dissents against the 
Federal Republic for reform for prisoners. Instead of depicting themselves as terrorists, 
the RAF managed to present themselves as victims of an oppressive State.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years 
later, the ‘communist ideal’ became irrelevant to the West German public as the new 
Federal Republic expanded its capitalistic economy. The East’s communistic model of 
governance had become irrelevant. The RAF became a symbol for the radical, leftist 
dallying with communism in the 1970s – although it continued to be trendy for younger 
anarchist teens for a while. The legacy of domestic terrorism during the 1970s produced a 
culture of criminal justice and security policies in West German society. The RAF’s 
terrorism, bombing, kidnapping, robbing, and killing functioned as a new outlet for 
frustrations of a nation that had historically acted within the law. Bad cultural memories 
of the RAF are in Germany’s not so distant past, but the uneven sympathy for the 
organization inspired some limited social and political reform. 
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Photograph 1 
 
 
Source: German History Docs. “Images-Generational Rebellion.” Retrieved 
September 22, 2017 (http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2395). 
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Photograph 2 
 
 
 
Source: Stern, Klaus. 2007. “Terrorist ohne Führerschein.” Der Spiegel, 
October 18. Retrieved September 22, 2017 
(http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/raf-a-948479.html).  
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Photograph 3 
 
 
 
Source: Alchetron. “Holger Meins”. Retrieved September 22, 2017 
(https://alchetron.com/Holger-Meins).  
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Photograph 4  
 
 
 
Source: Alchetron. “Holger Meins”. Retrieved September 22, 2017 
(https://alchetron.com/Holger-Meins).  
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